President George W. Bush will leave several foreign policy
legacies. The one that has gotten the most attention is the change of regimes
in Iraq, which after a rough patch at the end of his first term, has gotten
back on track due to the troop surge directed by Gen. David Petraeus. But in
the long run, President Bush may be remembered even more for the improvement of
U.S.-Indian relations. If South Asia is defined as running from the Persian
Gulf to the Malacca Straits, then closer ties between Washington and New Delhi
are not unrelated to American objectives in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts,
while also furthering larger interests across Asia.
When President Bush entered office, relations with India were
at low ebb. In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted rival nuclear tests, bringing
new U.S. sanctions against both countries. President Bill Clinton considered
Pakistan, with its support for Islamic terrorists in Afghanistan and Kashmir,
to be more dangerous than India, but felt compelled to be even-handed in the
cause of non-proliferation. The same requirement to appear even-handed came
into play again after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks when the
sanctions were lifted on both countries. There was a need to pull the Pakistani
regime into the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. Pakistan had played a
major role in creating the Taliban, who were giving sanctuary to al-Qaeda. The
U.S. approach to Islamabad used carrots and sticks. In the latter category were
improved relations with India, including a role for India in Afghan
reconstruction and an occasional mention of a possible request for Indian
troops.
The Bush administration was already warming to India for other
strategic reasons prior to 9/11. In May 2001, the Indian government had issued
a carefully worded endorsement of U.S. plans for a national missile defense
(NMD) system after Washington’s termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty with Russia.
Though the NMD
is called a limited system against rogue threats like that presented by North
Korea, China has feared it could counter its small nuclear force as well and
has loudly denounced the U.S. program. If America can blunt Beijing’s nuclear
ambitions, India would also benefit, as China poses the greatest security
threat to New Delhi. The threat India worries about from Pakistan is derived
mainly from the aid Beijing has given Islamabad’s nuclear and missile programs.
The Chinese alignment with Pakistan presents India with a risk of a two front
war, countering India’s greater inherent strength against Pakistan. The Taliban
conquest of most of Afghanistan was supported by Beijing as well as by
Islamabad. The Taliban sent parts of two U.S. cruise missiles fired in 1998 at
al-Qaeda camps to China for study. Chinese firms set up the Taliban’s
telecommunications system prior to the U.S. invasion. Beijing continues to ship
weapons through Pakistan that end up in the hands of Taliban and al-Qaeda
insurgents.
From Beijing’s perspective, aiding Pakistan keeps India focused
to the west, allowing the Chinese more freedom of action in Southeast Asia,
where it is the main source of support for the military dictatorship in Myanmar
(Burma). Beijing has built naval bases along Burma's coastline in the Bay of
Bengal, better designed to service Chinese warships than the non-existent
Myanmarese fleet.
In Tibet, Beijing has built all-weather military roads linking
army bases, major airfields and ballistic missile sites. China is increasing
its ability to launch strikes deep into India, by both aircraft and missiles,
in the wake of growing unrest by the Tibetan people against Chinese oppression.
While the United States and India have a common enemy in
radical Islam, whose terrorists were waging a campaign in the Indian province
of Kashmir long before 9/11, the larger common threat is from China. Beijing’s
rapid economic rise is giving the Communist regime the means to project its
power across a wide arc. The 2008 annual report to Congress from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of
China had as its key finding, “China’s expanding and improving military
capabilities are changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China’s
strategic capabilities have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region.”
From the U.S. perspective, India is the only country on the
Asian mainland that has the heft to counter China. From the Indian perspective,
the U.S. is a vital source for technology to speed its economic development,
and to improve its military capabilities. For example, India needs to match the
ability of Chinese nuclear submarines to remain submerged while launching
nuclear missiles, a senior Indian Navy planner recently told Defense News.
New Delhi also needs to improve its general naval capabilities. Zachariah
Mathews, a retired Indian Navy commodore, has identified three littoral regions
— the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal — that India needs to
dominate. India will have to obtain the technology and weapons systems from
foreign sources to do so. For example, the Indian frigate Tabar, which
sank a pirate ship off the African coast Nov. 19, is a Russian design built in
St. Petersburg. It also incorporates components from several other countries
including Britain, Denmark, Germany, Ukraine, and India itself.
Russia, particularly during the Soviet period, has been India’s
primary source for military equipment. But since the collapse of the USSR,
India has found this relationship less appealing. Russia is not the super power
it once was, its equipment is second rate, and it is no longer an ally against
China. Rather, Russia under Vladimir Putin has aligned Russia with China to
counter American “hegemony.” India has turned to France, Germany, Israel, and Britain
for arms, and is now looking for increased access to the American defense
industry. Indian naval officers now speak in the Pentagon’s language of “net
centric warfare.”
In the air, Lockheed
Martin's F-16 Fighting Falcon and Boeing's F-18 Super Hornet have already
emerged as the front-runners in the competition to sell 126 fighter jets to
India worth $12 billion. Russia, Sweden and France are also in the hunt for one
of the world’s richest export opportunities. Money, however, is not the only
reason Washington wants an American firm to win the Indian bid. An arms deal
will pull the military of the two countries together and foster
interoperability.
The way for closer ties was opened with the ratification of the
U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. The
implementing legislation was signed by President Bush on Oct. 8, a week after
it was passed by both houses of Congress. The Senate vote was 86-13, with both
Barack Obama and Joe Biden voting with the majority (along with John McCain and
Hillary Clinton). The immediate benefit is that it boosts America’s chances in
competition with Russia and France when bidding on the eight nuclear reactors
India plans to import by 2012. The larger gains go beyond the nuclear pact
itself. The diplomacy behind the agreement will expand a relationship that was
started by President Ronald Reagan in 1984 when he signed a memorandum of
understanding on high-tech sales to India. Under Secretary of State Nicholas
Burns said when the nuclear deal was signed that it was, “positive for United
States national security interest because it will help us cement our strategic
partnership with India, which is very important for our global interests.”
President-elect Obama needs to understand the value of what
President Bush has left him. During his presidential campaign, Obama raised
fears in India regarding a potential U.S. tilt towards Pakistan in the Kashmir
dispute. Obama’s thinking seems to be that to win greater Pakistani cooperation
against militants in its border provinces with Afghanistan; the U.S. should
help Islamabad advance its militant demands on India. Such a policy would only
embolden jihadists and reward radical elements in Pakistan’s army and
intelligence services who are the political enemies of the country’s new
democratic government. Afghanistan and Kashmir are not separate issues, but a
common cause for the Islamic terrorist movement. Alienating India in order to
give the militants a partial victory would be a strategic disaster for the
United States. Instead, Washington, in concert with NATO and India, need to
make clear to Islamabad that the legitimacy of its claim to sovereignty over
its border areas depends on preventing its territory from being used for attacks
against its neighbors.
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari understands that the
threat to the survival of his democratic government is internal, not external.
Pakistan now wants to normalize relations with India, a country that poses no
danger to Islamabad unless provoked. There is already an ongoing and productive
peace process, which has included important back-channel negotiations over
Kashmir. Rather than interfere with these discussions, Obama needs to keep
focused on the larger strategic importance of closer ties with New Delhi. India
is an emerging great power in Asia whose alignment with the United States is
vital to the maintenance of a balance of power favorable to American security
interests.