More than
100 years ago, decades before Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory,
an Indian nationalist named Bipin Chandra Pal predicted the world would eventually split into two
camps. On one side of this strategic divide, the prescient patriot saw forming a
Hindu, Jewish and Christian alliance confronted by a Chinese-Muslim axis on the
other.
The
United
States took a big step last Friday in turning this
prophecy into reality when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed a groundbreaking nuclear deal
in a ceremony in the State Department’s Benjamin Franklin Room after three years of negotiations.
Called the 123 Agreement after a section in the in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act,
the pact will allow India to buy vital nuclear fuel and
technology from American and other foreign companies. Besides strengthening
America’s growing strategic relationship
with the emerging South Asian power, observers say the pact will be regarded in
later years as one of the President George Bush’s greatest foreign policy
achievements.
“This
legislation will strengthen our global non-proliferation efforts, protect the
environment, create jobs, and assist India in meeting its growing needs in a
responsible manner,” said Bush, who was instrumental in the deal’s success. The
123 Agreement was approved in the United States Senate by 86-13 vote this month
only minutes before passing the $700 billion financial rescue bill. As a result,
it received little media attention, although the measure will probably cement
the American-Indian strategic alliance.
Previously, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) had banned nuclear fuel and technology sales to
India because the country had refused to
sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) in 1968 and had exploded a
nuclear weapon in 1974. India, however, believed the NNPT was
discriminatory, since it allowed only
France,
England, the
United
States, the Soviet Union and
China to possess nuclear weapons.
Finally
recognizing that India is a nuclear power and that the
clock cannot be turned back, the NSG waived the sanctions in September, paving
the way for the 123 Agreement. The lifting of the ban was also seen as a reward
for India’s responsible behaviour over the
years regarding its nuclear program. Unlike
Pakistan,
India did not share its nuclear secrets
with rogue regimes and regards the ban’s abolition as the end of the NSG
nations’ unjustified “technology apartheid” against the Hindu-majority
nation.
The 123
Agreement is a win-win proposition. The Indian economy has grown almost nine
percent annually the last five years but energy demands have not kept pace.
Power shortages are so bad that even the country’s capital,
New Delhi, experiences brownouts. So besides
India’s business groups, ordinary people
would also benefit from an improved energy
supply.
India currently has 22 nuclear reactors
that produce about three percent of the country’s electricity needs. Most of
these, however, are running well below capacity because
India could not buy nuclear fuel, due to
NSG sanctions, on the international market. But as soon as the ban was lifted,
France, the second-biggest nuclear fuel producer in the world after the
United
States, was able to negotiate a nuclear fuel
contract.
The
United
States will probably be the foreign country to
benefit most commercially from the $100 to $150 billion
India is expected to spend on nuclear
infrastructure over the next fifteen years. In order to help
India achieve its goal of increasing its
nuclear-generated electricity supply to seven percent, one American company, Westinghouse
Electric, according to the Wall Street Journal, is planning to build eight
nuclear reactors in India for about $40 billion.
Other
benefits the 123 Agreement provides include a lessening of
India’s dependence on foreign oil and a
boost for its well-known environmental problems. Nuclear energy is more
environmentally friendly than coal or oil burning power plants and thus will
help fight both pollution and global
warming.
Because of
this new closeness in the Indian-American strategic relationship, the United
States is also expected to have the inside track on the $30 billion in weapons purchases India plans to make over the next four years, as it
distances itself from Russia, its current chief armaments supplier (Israel is
India’s second main source of foreign weaponry). India recently bought its first American
warship and agreed to purchase six transport aircraft for one billion dollars.
But a
main reason for President Bush’s aggressive pursuit of Agreement 123 is that a
strong Indian economy is seen as essential in building up
India as a counterweight to
China, the other Asian giant. A reliable
supply of nuclear energy would help substantially in achieving this goal of
strengthening India and making her a more valuable
strategic ally.
Not
without reason, both the United
States and
India regard
China as their biggest military
competitor in this century. China’s current massive military
modernization program and the projection of its navy into the Pacific and
Indian Oceans have caused some concern.
India also directly faces the Chinese
military along a four thousand kilometer northern
border.
Critics
of the 123 Agreement say India might use the new technology it
receives to test another nuclear weapon, citing the fact that under the pact’s
provisions only Indian civilian nuclear reactors will come under international
inspection and not its eight military ones. But
India has been warned against this. In
such an eventuality, the deal would be immediately cancelled and sanctions
imposed once more, a risk the technology- and energy-starved country is unlikely
to take.
India, a country of 1.1 billion people,
should become one of the world’s great powers in this century but energy
shortages were hindering its great potential. And while some among
India’s 130 million Muslims may not like
their government’s new closeness with
America, they should regard it positively.
After all, it is America and the West helping their country
to achieve prosperity and not the other side of the
divide.