Where does Pakistan stand today in the terror war? What influence has the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had on the Muslim nation? Are Islamists close to achieving power? If they capture Pakistan, what will the ramifications be?

To discuss these and other questions with us today, Frontpae Symposium has assembled a distinguished panel. Our guests are:

Saifullah Khan Mahsud, a Research Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He has a Masters in Political Science from the University of Peshawar in Pakistan. He comes from the Waziristan tribal area of Pakistan.

Neil Doyle, one of the world's top investigative journalists and a leading expert on international terrorism. He is the author of Terror Base UK (Mainstream Publishing).

and

Steven Schippert, co-founder of the Center for Threat Awareness and managing editor for ThreatsWatch.org.

FP: Saifullah Khan Mahsud , Steven Schippert and Neil Doyle, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.

Neil Doyle, let’s begin with you.

I think the best way to begin this discussion is to touch on Bhutto’s assassination back in late December, 2007. What impact has it had on Pakistan?

Doyle: The assassination can be seen as a severe blow to hopes of curbing the growth of extremism in Pakistan. The former head of the ISI has claimed that the country is on the brink of an Islamist revolution.

At the moment, we're seeing an attempted land grab by Islamic militants in the North West Frontier Province. That largely revolves around control of villages in the Sawt valley where the Pakistan military appears to be relying on air power in an attempt to arrest the expansion. Increasingly, militants are talking about the "Islamic Emirate of Pakistan". It's a similar picture further south, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where the Taliban continues to push over the border into Afghanistan and claim to be knocking on the city gates of Kandahar, their former stronghold.

FP: What are the chances that Islamic fundamentalists will take power in Pakistan?

Doyle: There is increased military activity in the North West Frontier Province, but it's limited to air strikes and road blockades. If the Pakistani government was serious, you'd expect to see ground troops flooding into the area. There does seem to be doubt about the willingness of government troops to fight, when push comes to shove. In the past, Musharraf relied on negotiated truces to curb the expansion, though the extremists called his bluff. The chances of the militants taking power has increased. In reality, though, they are still a long way from achieving their goals.

FP: Mr.Mahsud?

Mahsud: Benazir's tragic assassination can have negative as well as positive implications for security in Pakistan. We have lost a courageous leader who had come out openly against the extremism in the country.

I beg to differ with Mr. Doyle when he questions the Pakistan army's sincerity in fighting the extremist elements in the troubled regions of the country.

To the dismay of the powerful and fiercely independent Pushtun tribes inhabiting the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan has deployed more than a 100,000 soldiers in the region and in the event it has jeopardized the security that it enjoyed on its western borders with Afghanistan. It has lost more than a thousand of its best soldiers fighting these elements, it has faced and continues to face numerous terrorist strikes in the shape of suicide attacks and bombings in the country and moreover, its extensive ongoing ground operations against the extremist elements in the Swat Valley have proved largely successful. Therefore, I don't see a reason why anyone should doubt Pakistan's sincerity in fighting extremism in the region.

Schippert: It remains an accurate if unfortunate observation that Benazir Bhutto likely will have eventually done more for Pakistan in her death than she ever did or could have in her life. Case in point: the current Pakistani military offensive operations in South Waziristan. It is, in response to accusations that Baitullah Mehsud was behind Bhutto's assassination, the most forward-leaning approach to the al-Qaeda-Taliban cancer plaguing Pakistan and, by extension, the world.

Not only is the Pakistani regular army directly engaged, but special forces units of the Pakistani SSG are also directly engaged. Up until this point, the far less capable and lesser trained and equipped Interior Ministry Frontier Corps paramilitary forces have been nearly exclusively employed in situations that involved direct fighting in the Waziristan agencies. In fact, Musharraf had gone so far as to state in November that by January (today), they would be the only Pakistani forces in the whole of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas dominated by al-Qaeda and Mehsud's newly united Tehrik-e-Taliban. He had said that the Pakistani Army would be extracted completely.

Now, with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the fingering of Baitullah Mehsud, there is an impetus that did not exist previously that serves Musharraf enough domestically to exert a full measure of force against the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance, at least in South Waziristan, but likely elsewhere as the Taliban-al-Qaeda response will be a wave of terror that must be in kind responded to.

With much due respect to my friend my friend Saifullah, a good and intelligent man and invaluably knowledgeable regarding Waziristan, at issue for me is less the number of troops historically deployed by Musharraf in the areas, but their effectiveness. We should also be careful to distinguish between troops of the Frontier Corps paramilitaries and the troops of the more professional Pakistani Army. While the troops were deployed and in numbers Saifullah notes, it cannot be argued that they were effective in keeping a lid on the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance.

Readers and leaders would do well to consider that the answer lies in a balanced equation. Meaning, those who call for more troops and aggressive offensive operations by the Pakistani Army and FC forces - as I have - are right, but not as the sole solution. Likewise, those who call for negotiations and dealings with the tribal leaders of FATA - as Musharraf has - are right also, but not as the sole solution. Some who call for military action call for little or nothing else. Likewise, some who call for talks do so while hoping to diminish military action before, during and after them to prevent stoking anger. The proper counterinsurgency strategy is a dynamic but decisive mixture of both. It is not a zero-sum game, and there is no purely military or purely political solution.

But in order to do this, as Musharraf said in his defense of the incredibly ill-advised Waziristan accords - which set up North and South Waziristan as quasi-official unfettered Taliban and al-Qaeda havens - we must understand the tribes and the tribal dynamics of the areas in question. We cannot just go in guns blazing. Nothing turns an otherwise potentially receptive civilian population against you like the effects of great numbers of collateral casualties and the perception of military operations conducted without concern for discerning between combatant and civilian.

Likewise, as evidenced by the failed Waziristan accords (and others in other agencies), entering into talks with tribal leaders with flowers in the muzzles of Army weapons is equally counterproductive and empowering to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, whose own security is thus preserved.

Pakistan appears now to be approaching a more balanced attempt at both, still talking to tribal leaders and - when they are assassinated by Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists - military force engaged with a measure of determination. As Saifullah can attest, no one knows the tribal dynamics of Pakistan like a Pakistani. This is a positive development.

However, artillery barrages and Pakistani Air Force bombings of Taliban-held yet also civilian populated villages and towns is perhaps as counterproductive in the long term as it is productive against the Taliban in the short term.

However difficult and dangerous, the solution is as it has been in Iraq - door to door, neighborhood by neighborhood, town by town clearing and holding; discriminating at close contact (vice bombing/artillery) between civilian and combatant, demonstrating concern for Pakistani civilians rather than perceived indiscriminate disdain; and enlisting the local populations as friend rather than foe, with ground level knowledge of the enemy near them.

But to do this requires accepting increased risk of casualties in combat, civil affairs consciousness, and a firm understanding of the clans and tribes of the area, what their grievances and desires are, and taking all of this into account while eliminating the enemy.

Immeasurably more difficult than dropping 2,000 pound munitions from 10,000 feet or artillery barrages from miles away. But it is the only way for a real victory and long term security, and one in which the local populations must share in, rather than feeling also defeated.

Doyle: Doubts about the effectiveness of Pakistan's troops have been raised in many circles recently and I think it's an appropriate issue to raise: doubts about the government's overall commitment to combating the militants are more common, for sure.

I should say that I didn't intend to suggest that Musharraf himself was insincere in vowing to curb the rise of extremism because, of course, he was the main beneficiary and he was looking at a struggle for survival. There are fair questions to be asked about the implementation of those policies, however. Some will take the reported death of the al-Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libi at face value; others might ask why these incidents occur so infrequently.

FP: Neil Doyle’s view is very much legitimized by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio’s piece “Pakistan Surrenders.” Right Mr. Mahsud? In the past, Musharraf ceded authority to the terrorists in North Waziristan and also released a large number of jihadists from prison. This cannot be denied.

Mahsud: I thank Steve for his invaluable comments. I agree with him that the solution to the problem requires a combination of political and military approaches where well being of the non-combatants is kept paramount. However, I believe that effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations requires a lot of time and patience, especially when the insurgents enjoy the advantage of a friendly population and knowledge of the terrain- it took the US 8 years to achieve some degree of effectiveness in Iraq and in Afghanistan, the NATO are still at loggerheads with each other on the methods to be adopted and are far from effective. I would therefore hope that analysts would be patient with Pakistan and be appreciative of its efforts and the sacrifices it has made and continues to make for the war against extremism. I would also hope that Pakistan's deployment of a large number of troops in the troubled areas and the loss of its soldiers would be seen as Pakistan's endeavor to be effective.

With due respect to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bill Roggio, highly respected names in the field of counterinsurgency, the 2006 agreement between the government of Pakistan and the Utmanzai tribe of North Waziristan that was seen as 'surrender' by them was an agreement entered into in good faith by the Pakistani government and was part of its broader strategic policy to control the spread of Talibanisation in the area and was inline with its constitutional obligations towards the tribes. The 'terrorists' that were allegedly released by the Pakistani government as a result of the agreement, were mostly innocent civilians who were arrested by the Pakistani government under the collective responsibility clause of the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act (FCR) - the law under which the tribal areas of Pakistan are governed- and therefore once the tribe agreed to stop infiltration by the Taliban into the neighboring Afghanistan and the settled districts of Pakistan, cease attacks on the Pakistani administrative and security personal, expel the foreigners from their area or ensure their good behavior incase it wasn't possible to expel them, then it was only logical that the Pakistani authorities would release the arrested tribesmen.

That the agreement did not prove as successful as the Pakistani authorities had hoped, should not lead us to question their sincerity in the fight against terror.

The tribal areas of Pakistan were administered by the British Indian government (colonial era) through agreements. Pakistan, the successor state adopted the same policy. The agreements lay the ground for future state of relations between the tribes and the government.

The institution of the tribal elders was weakened considerably by the rise of Taliban in the tribal areas. The present efforts by Pakistani government to effect peace agreements is an attempt to strengthen the tribal elders by bringing them to the fore and making them arbiters in the present state of affairs. This is likely to help restore public faith and confidence in the institution of tribal elders and restore their waning influence. Gradually, the government could introduce development in the region through the tribal elders, thereby eliminating poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. This holistic strategy of combining military power with political, economic and institutional reforms may have the effect of neutralizing the militants in the region.

Please note also that peace agreements have worked effectively provided patience is observed. The first peace agreement signed between the government and the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe of South Waziristan Agency in April 2004 – commonly known as Shakai Agreement – is a case in point. It took the government three years of patient manipulation to create rift in Taliban ranks and convince the Ahmedzai tribe to purge their area of all foreign militants – especially Tahir Yuldeshev-led Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in April, 2007. We also know that infiltration by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban into Afghanistan's Paktika province from Ahmedzai territory ceased completely by May 2007.

The use of the Frontier Corps instead of the Pakistan Army makes political as well military sense. The FC is exclusively manned by Pashtuns and therefore they are naturally trained for mountain warfare, have far better knowledge of the terrain in FATA than the Army and share the same culture as the people residing there.

The FC was raised by the British Indian government in the late nineteenth century to maintain control over the tribes and the tribal areas. After creation of Pakistan FC has remained deployed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and is responsible for manning the Pak-Afghan border (also known as the Durand Line). FC is raised on the lines of rapid reactionary force and is equipped with light weapons. The present strategy of the Pakistani government to train FC for counter-insurgency warfare with technical and material support from the United States would be effective in conducting counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, since the terrain is mostly mountainous, and only light-armed FC infantry could deliver effectively as against the regular Pakistan Army dominated by the Punjabi ethnic group and primarily trained for conventional warfare.

Also, the officers of the FC are usually taken from the Pushtun cadre of Pakistani armed forces, which is an ideal combination of military strategy and understanding of local environs of FATA. Moreover, the fact that FC falls under the Ministry of Interior gives it an added advantage since the administrative setup of FATA is also appointed and overseen by the same Ministry. This would help in effective coordination between FC and the FATA administration.

Although one is not totally averse to the use of Army in FATA as their expertise may be required in the short term. However, in the long run, I believe that a better trained and equipped FC and a rejuvenated institution of the Tribal Elders -protected by the government as Steve suggested- coupled with administrative and economic reforms are the answers to the problem of militancy we face in FATA.

Schippert: Two things regarding Saifullah's response above. I respectfully submit that the statement that "the [Miranshah] agreement [in North Waziristan] did not prove as successful as the Pakistani authorities had hoped" is quite an understatement. As of just a few months ago, al-Qaeda's checkerboard of terrorist training camps numbered above thirty in North Waziristan. And when US and international intelligence reports speak of a fully reconstituted al-Qaeda base of operations in Pakistan, that base's heart and soul rests squarely within this area addressed by the Miranshah Accord barely seventeen months ago.

That said, I certainly appreciate the manner in which he explained the Frontier Corps. And they are all that he says and, potentially, more. But they are not - in their current state - enough to defeat the Taliban-al-Qaeda fighters. The Taliban and al-Qaeda field forces with superior motivation, and this is a force multiplier that cannot be left out of the equation.

Can the indigenous Frontier Corps paramilitary forces defeat them with superior training, effective counterinsurgency tactics, and increasingly honed skills? Yes, I agree with Saifullah for all of the reasons he states. But the question on the minds of many observers who support the massive US aid being poured into developing precisely this effort with the FC is this: Is there enough time to get them to this level?

To be fair, there have been many including myself that never expected to be discussing a President Musharraf in the present tense in 2008. Yet he indeed remains. Likewise, Pakistan seems in a persistent lurch of instability and turmoil. I've always described the PSYOP and insurgency strategy employed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban as one of "Death by a Thousand Cuts." One hopes that Pakistan is more cohesive and resilient at its core beyond the violent tribal areas, and perhaps it is.

But the question remains: Can and will the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance shift its strategy of patient cuts to an all-out broad insurgency campaign, and if so, can Pakistan survive it?

One thing is for certain, they are not going to sit idly by and watch the FC ramped up into a more effective force and await a battle on our terms. Sayed Saleem Shahzad reports that, according to a member of al-Qaeda's shura in Peshawar, the shift in strategy may be sooner rather than later.

Doyle: I can't see any prospect of Pakistan falling into the hands of jihadists any time soon. The militants have anchored themselves in the border areas and don't look to be like moving, despite pressure on both flanks. It is similar to Iraq in that, despite the day to day military gains and losses, insurgent networks remaining functioning.

Public attitudes and changes in political of leadership in the West will have a direct impact on Pakistan. There are countries wobbling over their military commitments in Afghanistan. A swing in public opinion towards troop withdrawals would adversely affect attempts to build a peaceful democracy in Pakistan. It is all very much in the balance.

FP: Thank you Neil Doyle, and what is your take of the election? Who does it help and who does it harm? What should U.S. policy now be toward Pakistan?

Doyle: Under the subsequent power-sharing deal between the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-N, I think we can expect to see a gradual increase in pressure on the president to relinquish his position. It is very difficult to say whether Pakistan is now going to be fundamentally changed, chiefly because the election was about factional control rather than policy issues. The direction that country will be headed in will become clearer as policies are thrashed out in the coming weeks and months.

The people voted overwhelming for change, so they should be the main winners, if the newly elected government can deliver on bringing peace and stability to the country. The extremists have demonstrated, with the latest wave of bombings, that they are determined to plough on regardless. Musharraf and the military look to be the chief losers, though positive public sentiment towards the politicians could be short-lived.

The key is the country's relationship with the US and the West. Musharraf lost because he was seen as being a puppet of the US and compromising the sovereignty of the country by co-operating with efforts to combat al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It's unlikely that the alliance will cease operating, so the new government will have to manage the same problem that has dogged the president. It's going to be fascinating to see how this evolves.

Mahsud: I agree with Mr. Doyle that the political scene in Pakistan has changed considerably after the elections. President Musharraf's hold on power has weakened as a new coalition government, dominated by anti-Musharraf parties, has been sworn in Islamabad and the four provinces. Secular nationalist parties have gained most of the seats in the recent elections at the expense of the alliance of the Islamic political parties known as Mutahida Majlis-e-Aml (MMA) which had won an unprecedented number of seats in the last elections. This augurs well for Pakistan's fight against extremism as one of the reason for the extremists to gain foothold in the North West Frontier province (NWFP) and FATA was the presence of an extremist friendly MMA government in NWFP. I also believe that a popularly elected government is likely to have the backing of the people for their anti-extremism policies. Moreover, the close nexus between the government in power and the general population is going to make the environment less friendly for the extremists to operate in.

What I saw on ground during my visit to Pakistan earlier this month give me reasons to be optimistic about the future of the country. The morale of the security forces is considerably better than before and the general population is slowly but gradually becoming aware of the danger that is posed by the extremists and the need to tackle the same on priority basis. The secular political parties that have formed governments at the centre in Islamabad and more importantly in the NWFP have expressed their resolve to work in tandem to reverse the process of extremism in Pakistan and to do so by a combination of political and military strategies consisting of administrative and political reforms in FATA, negotiations with all segments of society in the conflict zones and precise use of force where necessary to avoid damage to non-combatants.

However, I also observed that Pakistan is facing a growing water, energy and food crisis. It would be absolutely necessary for the international community to help Pakistan with these issues so that it can concentrate its energies on the fight against extremism.

Schippert: A couple of things in conclusion. First, it must be said here that Saifullah Mahsud's venture into Pakistan to speak with Taliban leaders in Waziristan and the NWFP displays no small amount of courage. All outsiders, even those like Saifullah who grew up there but have relocated, are viewed especially suspiciously by the Taliban. And I am hopeful readers here need not be reminded what the Taliban do to those they suspect are spies. Thank you for your work, Saifullah.

Second, I agree with Mr. Doyle's conclusion that it does not appear likely that Pakistan will fully fall under control of the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance any time soon. The stinging defeat handed the Islamists at the Pakistani polls is an encouraging sign. However, equally encouraging has been the degree to which internal 'seams' between allied yet at the same time rivaling factions have been successfully exploited within the Taliban 'federation' of groups. Musharraf deserves some due credit for this. Baitullah Mehsud's formal creation of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in order to sew unity was largely a reaction to this made necessary by the exploitation of internal fighting and inextricably linked.

I was one of those sounding the alarm over the past year about the risks associated with the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance's aims, (at the time barely impeded) momentum, and proximity to the levers of Pakistani power, Islamabad and all or part of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Awareness began to grow here in America and people began to more clearly understand, either explicitly or implicitly, the threat risk equation. And that was the principal aim of my writing: Awareness of the threat. It's basic mathematics, not calculus.

Threat Risk = Consequences X Likelihood

The 'Consequences' of Taliban-al-Qaeda control of levers of power and thus nuclear weapons within Pakistan - either overt or in the shadows through men like Hamid Gul or Aslam Beg - remains at or near the gravest of scales. The factor of 'Likelihood' is the wildcard in the equation and remains a subjective, perception-based value. As one perceives the 'Likelihood' to increase or decrease, the overall Threat Risk greatly changes up or down based on the sheer graveness of the 'Consequences' half of the equation. This is why analyses from different sources can be all over the map on the very same day.

Right now, in my view, the Threat Risk of Taliban-al-Qaeda control of one or more Pakistani nuclear weapons appears to be relatively low - but the consequences require constant vigilance. And this threat risk is completely separate from that posed by a growing and strengthening of al-Qaeda (and also the Taliban) as an international terrorist organization wholly outside the nuclear equation. This Threat Risk remains quite high.

On that front, we appear at a lull - a crossroads, if you will. The ball is in the new Pakistani government's court and the sound defeat of the Islamist parties is a positive development, clearly.

However, the new government's stated desire to relieve military pressure on the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance - as can be seen with its recent ceasefire with Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan - does not appear to bode well. Terrorist organizations do not change their stripes, and deeply religiously motivated groups are by definition rather inflexible. Ceasefires tend to serve as recovery and resupply gaps. Add to that development the fact that a Taliban shura council just declared sharia law in a NWFP agency (outside the FATA), and there is little room to conclude that the terrorists are in any form of retreat or reassessment.

The battle here - for Pakistan and the rest of the world - will rage on in violent fits and spurts for the foreseeable future. And for Pakistan, the battle must be for the hearts and minds of the citizens of the FATA and NWFP under Taliban-al-Qaeda control and/or influence. Anbar province in Iraq is the model. How to get 'there' with a very different ethnic, religious and social matrix in FATA/NWFP is the $64,000 anthropological question. And it's also why Saifullah Mahsud's work - and that of his peers - is so critically important in my view.

Neil Doyle, Saifullah Mahsud, and Dr. Glazov, thank you all for this discussion.

FP: Neil Doyle, Saifullah Mahsud and Steve Schippert, thank you for joining Frontpage Symposium.