As we witness the Holy Jihad against America escalating in Iraq, we are confronted by the question: where are we headed? Should the U.S. intensify its military efforts? Cut and run? Implement Iraqification as fast as possible? What prices come with these potential moves? To discuss these issues with Frontpage Symposium today, we are joined by Victor David Hanson, a scholar at the Hoover Institute and the author of the new book An Autumn of War: What America Learned from September 11 and the War on Terrorism; Khalid Al-Dakhil, an assistant professor of political sociology at King Saud University in Saudi Arabia. He has been a columnist for London's Al Hayat newspaper and is now a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Endowment; and Jonathan Kay, the editorials editor of the National Post.
Glazov: Welcome gentlemen to Frontpage Symposium. Let's begin with a general question: Can we say still say with confidence that it was the right thing for the U.S. to go into Iraq? How do you read the current situation?
Hanson: Examine three points (1) no more scuds into Kuwait, Israel, invasions of Iraq and Iran; no more worry about petro-dollar-fed weapons programs; no more $20 billion/300,000 sortie no-fly zones; no more genocide of Kurds/Shiites; no more destruction of the Marsh Arabs; no more violations of the 1991 armistice agreements; no more troops in Saudi Arabia; et al.; (2) so far at a cost of less than 400 lives, America has destroyed the Taliban and Hussein regimes (the worst in the Middle East), offered a chance of freedom for 50 million people; suffered no more 9-11s; and changed the landscape of the region in a way that is quite unlike the old Cold War (just pump oil/keep out communists) Realpolitik that led to the appeasement or promotion of tyrants. (3) despite the current hysteria, systematic progress toward a civil society continues in Iraq, as power, schools, politics, trade, and infrastructure are getting better each month. If we really are in a terrible war against Islamofascists and their assorted autocratic abettors, then having such predisposed murderers collect in Iraq where they can be engaged and destroyed in the larger strategic picture of a global war is dangerous of course, but still not necessarily bad.
Kay: Assuming George W. Bush invaded Iraq with the intention of keeping U.S. troops there until the country is put on a stable path to pluralistic, representative government, then the attack was justified. The universal tyranny and endless warmongering that afflict the Arab world represents both a roadblock to human progress for 250-million people and a threat to world peace. Bush gets credit for bold thinking: A democratic Iraq will change the region.
Overall, I think it was a mistake for the coalition to focus single-mindedly on weapons of mass destruction in the lead-up to war. Now that no weapons have been found, the United States has been made to look ridiculous, the war has been needlessly discredited, and conspiracy theories about oil are being nourished. It would have been wiser to emphasize the benefits Iraq's
liberation will bring to ordinary Iraqis. Saddam Hussein was a monster. And the current terrorism plague notwithstanding, his removal stands as one of the greatest human-rights triumphs of our era.
Al-Dakhil: The line that the US invaded Iraq to remove the dictator, establish democracy, and turn Iraq into a model for the whole region is so simple, and too good to believe. Worse, this line of thinking makes the Pentagon looks like a charity organization, all it wants is simply to extend a helping hand to other people, spread democracy, fights the autocrats everywhere. And it's ok if these efforts on the part of the Pentagon cost American lives and casualties (in the hundreds and thousands), and American treasure ( in the hundreds of billions of US dollars ). After all that's what the Pentagon is for. But this is silly, the Pentagon is a state institution, and its main mission is to defend and protect the state interests. States are very jealous of their interests.
In terms of the US interests and objectives, I would think that it's too early to make the judgement of whether it was the right thing to invade Iraq. On the other hand it was certainly wrong to invade the country, and through in the turmoil it is in now, and then say rolling back is not an option. Because in this sense, the US made itself, and against the will of the whole world, the judge, the plaintiff and the defendant at the same time. Now we don't know what is going to happen to Iraq and the Iraqi people. Even the Bush administration does not know. Who is responsible for that? It's irresponsible in the midst of chaos, violence, and confusion to keep saying that the US removed the dictator, and on its way of creating democracy in Iraq. People lives and future, both Americans and Iraqis, are on line now.
Kay: Mr. Al-Dakhil says that "The line that the US invaded Iraq to remove the dictator, establish democracy, and turn Iraq into a model for the whole region is so simple." Actually, it's not that simple: It's complex. In fact, it's so complex that the United States felt it was not a theory of war Americans would support -- which is why the Bush administration instead opted to emphasize WMDs, a far simpler approach.
The more that comes out about the early planning for this war, the more it has become obvious that early boosters such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Dick Cheney really had great ambitions: They saw the liberation of Iraq as a step that would lead to nothing less than the democratization of the Arab world. (For more information on how this would happen, see Fouad Ajami's article "Iraq and the Arabs' Future" in the January/February 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs. Ajami's work, of course, has had a great influence on the Bush administration.) This, perhaps more than WMDs, was what was on their minds when they drew up invasion plans.
I believe the Wolfowitz/Ajami hope for a democratic revolution in the Middle East will succeed in the long run, and that the 2003 Iraq war will be remembered as a turning point for the region. But I admit the theory can't be proved, and that it may backfire. I also admit it is possible to argue,
as a matter of principle, that it is none of the West's business if two dozen Arab countries want to wallow in dictatorship, and that America should not be the world's social engineer. But now that the United States has invaded, there's really no good or principled argument for having the Americans get out early. An early exit would lead to the worst of both worlds: It would not erase the death, destruction and local humiliation that has already come from the war. At the same time, it would deny the democratic dividend that would come from the stable, pluralistic government the United States intends to establish.
Glazov: So where are we headed in Iraq? Some critics of the Bush administration believe that the best thing for the U.S. to do is to cut its losses and pull out. Wouldn’t this be a drastic mistake?
Al-Dakhil: At this point it is a drastic mistake. It simply means the collapse of the US strategy in the whole Middle East. The question, though, is this; how and why the Bush administration put itself in such a position? Staying the course is becoming disastrous by the day, and withdrawing is not an option?
My feeling is that, for the time being at least, the US is stuck in Iraq. They relied not only on fuzzy intelligence misinformation, may be faked information, but they also relied on the Iraqi opposition that does not seem to enjoy the minimum degree of support and credibility among the Iraqis. The opposition did not have grass roots. And that was one of the reasons why Saddam Hussein managed to stay in power for more than 30 years.
More than that the US lacks credibility of its own, and so cannot master the consent and support of the Iraqis. The Iraqi people are happy to have rid themselves of the dictator. But it's not clear, at least, if this means they're happy with the means, and the alternative offered to them. Let's face it, the alternative is not clear either. What is the price that the Iraqis have to pay for being "liberated" at the hands of the American forces? It's sort of naiveté, arrogance, or both to assume that the Iraqis will simply embrace the American all the way and without a question asked. Then there's the fact the administration has alienated the UN, the EU, and the Arabs, especially those who neighbor Iraq. Yet, they want everyone to chip in; money, troops, logistics, ...etc. But the fact is that now the Americans are on their own. They chose it to be that way. And they have to live with it.
Hanson: "Chip in"? When has that really happened? Let us have a serious conversation, not something brewed up in a European hothouse.
"Alienated"? Does that involve the $3 billion of largess given annually to Jordan, the PA, and Egypt? Or the $27 billion to Iraq? (Could not some of the $800 billion of Saudi money invested outside the kingdom go to the Arab brethren for things other than madrassas and "charities"?). I saw few French or Saudi jets over the skies of Kosovo, bombing Christians to save Muslims. The Arab League embraced Russia, that was censured and lectured only by the US for its Islamicide in Grozny. American diplomats, not Saudis, lectured the Kuwaitis about ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in 1991. Even in Gulf War I, the real fighting was done by Britain and the US. So, of course, America has been on its own quite a lot---ask who was responsible for the end of the Cold War or the ruin of Noriega, Milosevic, or the Taliban. Again nothing is new there. Allies that are protected by US troops and vent easy frustration--whether in Germany, Saudi Arabia, or South Korea-- at their dependency is the same old broken record.
Of course, the US can't and won't leave Iraq until the situation is stable--which may occur a lot quicker than we can rebuild on the moonscape in Manhattan. For the vast majority of Iraqis the material situation is far better-- and they know it. Yet the problem is real and is one of pride and honor. No people appreciates salvation from abroad (cf. the French in 1944). We need to involve the Iraqis more, not just in concrete matters of defense and self-rule, but in less tangible ways such as public relations and deference. They should be holding their own press conferences, and explaining to the world the great strides already made in a mere 6 months. Only that way can they receive proper credit for what ultimately must be their own achievement in establishing a consensual society, which, if successful, will be the landmark event of our times. Baathists, al Qaedists, Wahhabis, Syrians, Iranians and many others cannot allow this to succeed; if it does, it will begin to free the people of the Middle East both from the grip of lunatic theocracy and murderous autocracy--and ultimately even from Western patronizing and sermonizing as well.
Re: "opposition": Saddam stayed in power because 2 million perished due to state-sponsored murder and his megalomaniac invasions--an amorality that should have ended in 1991; we are culpable both for this ogre's disastrous survival in 1991 and his much needed demise in 2003.
Finally, suicide bombing is not specific to Iraq, but in fact has killed more in the aggregate in the West Bank, Israel, Bali, and yes Saudi Arabia. But the genuinely novel development is in fact in Saudi Arabia: the Royal Family's old four-part policy of surviving despite its own gargantuan corruption (e.g., 1: buy off the clerics with subsidies, madrassas, and medievalism at home; divert through bribery al Qaeda terror to the US; allow popular frustration to vent in state-controlled media against the US and "the Jews"; and spread largess in the US among think-tanks, insiders, and ex-diplomats and generals to ensure culpable denial) is now in shambles. There will be no US troops in Saudi Arabia very soon, and the Kingdom on its own must decide to what degree it embraces popular reform without falling into the abyss of chaos and Al-Qaedism.
Kay: I agree with Mr. Al-Dakhil that the Iraqi opposition figures the United States originally pinned their hopes on have turned out to be flops. From what I can tell, the Pentagon's original plan was to install Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi as a sort Iraqi version of Hamid Karzai, and
then nudge the country toward democracy from there. It now turns out that Chalabi conned Washington by overstating his street credibility in Iraq. His failure has left the United States scrambling for other options.
The overall situation in Iraq is much better than people imagine, however: The Shiite and Kurd areas, which account for 85% of the country's population, are largely peaceful. Almost 100% of the violence is coming from the Sunnis concentrated to the west of Baghdad, a group that rightly fears its privileged status under Saddam will be lost. If the United States were an old-fashioned colonial power, it would simply hand the keys to the country over to a quisling Shiite government and let the Shiite majority deal with the Sunnis as they will. However, that would produce a bloodbath, and perhaps even large-scale refugee movements, and so it is not an option.
The United States cannot leave Iraq before the security situation is settled and an orderly transition to a pluralistic Iraqi government has been made. This is true not only because this is what humanitarian considerations require, but because the United States cannot be made to look as if it is running away. It is an unfortunate fact of human nature -- and the cutthroat political culture that dominates the Middle East in particular -- that perceived weakness is always punished. The failure of the United States to finish off Saddam in the first Gulf War, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon in 2000 under Hezbollah pressure, the U.S. flight from Somalia in 1993, the puny U.S. response after the 1998 African embassy bombings -- all these were taken as signs by militant Arabists and Islamists that the United States was a paper tiger that could not stomach a real battle. Having decimated this conceit with victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States must not revive it by fleeing Iraq in the face of Sunni terrorism.
Al-Dakhil: The unexpected return of Paul Bremer, the American appointed civil administrator of Iraq, to Washington signal the difficulties the US is facing there. Mr. Kay's point that the US has no choice but stay the course until it leads to a democratic and stable government is well taken. But it remains to be asked whether the course the way it is being run will lead to the expected result. And then, what is the price the US is expecting in return for the "liberation" of Iraq. I would say that the American position is not as easy and promising as some think it is. The Shi'ites, for instance, cannot be said to be on the side of the Americans. They're happy that Saddam is gone. There's no question about that. But, this does not mean that they're embracing the Americans.
For one thing, the Shi'ites are divided between the camp of Mugtada as-sadr, who is calling for the withdrawal of the American forces, and those who prefer having a stable government before any American withdrawal. On the other hand, the US is on the record wanting to topple the Iranian government, and crush the Lebanesse party of Hizbullah, both of which are shi'ite, and represent the shi'ite triumph after the Iranian revolution. By itself, this suggests that the relationship between the shi'ite and the American in Iraq is not clear, to say the least. On that basis, the shi'ite position cannot be taken for granted. On their part, the Kurd could be said to be the closest to the Americans, although the two differ on their position toward Turkey. All in all, it is more appropriate to say that there's some sort of a marriage of convenience between the Americans and most Iraqis at this point. And that's what makes it difficult to predict how things are going to go from here.
In response to Mr. Hanson, I would say that it is the US who is asking the others to chip in, but not all those others are willing to do so. remember the donation conference in Madrid one or two weeks ago. And remember that Saudi Arabia, and Iran chipped in, especially Saudi Arabia with more than one billion dollars. France, Germany and Russia sent low level delegation. The US cannot ask the others to make their aid in the form of grants, simply because every thing in Iraq is under the control of the Americans. Therefore, it is the US who should hand in the grants to the Iraqis, because Iraq is under American occupation.
I don't think it is appropriate for Mr. Hanson to patronize here about Arab brotherhood. If he is trying to make a point about Arab, and Saudi corruption, then he is correct. Corruption has been one of the serious problems plaguing the Saudi political system. But then, and unfortunately, using political and financial briberies is part of the international political game. How much did the US pay Turkey to to open its border for the American forces during the war, and to send in its troops during the occupation? Finally, any money that would go to Iraq now would be going to the American authorities, and not to "brother Iraqis". So let's not play such a game.
Hanson: It is no game; remember carefully what I said. I argued that a successful Iraq will, in fact, end patronizing of Arabs. The irony of this entire debate is that the only process that will truly give Iraq or the Middle East autonomy and pride--in the manner of Asia or Latin America--and freedom from American patronizing is the process now underway in Iraq. The only solution is a free economy and society that will end the present pathology of these unfree regimes channelling their own failures in closed media against the Americans and the "Jews".
The blame game is really is an tiresome pathetic exercise and has damaged the Arab people terribly as the world finally caught on to it and witnesses daily the horrifying invective, sick cartoons, and blood-curdling op-eds that emanate out of Cairo, Damascus, and elsewhere. In fact, as the tragedy with the Italians demonstrates, many countries participate out of shared values not just money or self-interest. Had we not offered Turkey some money Mr. Al-Dakhil would not doubt complain that we were insensitive to short-term damage to the Turkish economy.
We need not be utopians; critics can bicker over methods and slights, but at some point observers of good faith cannot miss the central issue of our times: one of the worst fascist killers of the age was disposed--and would never have been disposed had the UN or Europe been in charge--and something much better is in now a real possibility. And the US is at least listening and not in some Pavlovian fashion supporting the old autocracies on the basis of oil and anti-communism.
So despite questions of pride and stature, surely the transition from Baathism to consensuality is a good thing. We wish it were possible without our help, but then we wished that were true too for the Germans and the Japanese. As for the current crisis, read accounts in 1945-6; our less hysterical media of the age still ran daily reports about resurgent Nazism, Polish terrorists killing Germans, hunger, murdering of Americans, and the hopelessness of it all. The real story will be next year or so, when elections are held, the economy is freed from past statism and Baathist corruption, and the people are broadcast on al Jazeera enjoying a degree of freedom unthinkable elsewhere in the region. It will be burdensome for many intellectuals in the Middle East to see that reform was foreign induced, but that is no reason out of pride, envy, or pique not to at least grasp that reform was sorely needed and the only hope for the region.
Finally, all this is inexplicable without 9-11 and the central truth that for nearly twenty years terrorists from the Middle East, often aided, sheltered, and abetted by both enemies and friends of the United States, killed Americans routinely, without consequences, and often to the applause of the Arab Street. People should realize that Americans now regard such killing as war and are prepared to finish what others have started.
Kay: I agree the news from Iraq is terrible. I am writing these words on Wednesday, Nov. 12, the day terrorists attacked an Italian military compound, killing at least 16 troops and several Iraqi civilians. The Italians will likely be sent packing, following on the heels of the UN and the Red Cross. Bush has also told Bremmer to speed up the transfer of power to an Iraqi administration so that the United States can get out of Dodge. The terrorists have grounds to believe they are winning, in other words. I didn't predict any of this: I was one of those commentators who thought Saddam was such a brutal thug that any replacement regime would automatically be greeted like manna from heaven.
Francis Fukuyama was far more prescient. Last December, the American scholar wrote a brilliant essay in which he argued that 9/11 had caused America's conservatives to embrace proactive "idealism" in foreign policy. The hallmark of the program would be "an ambitious road map for the wholesale reordering of the politics of the Middle East, beginning with the replacement of Saddam Hussein by a democratic, pro-Western government." But presciently, he warned: "It is not at all clear that the American public understands it is getting into an imperial project as opposed to a brief in-and-out intervention in Iraq ... This is, after all, an exceptional nation. But the grounds for prolonged military and economic involvement in the Middle East, and the kinds of sacrifices this may entail, have not yet even begun to be laid."
About 400 U.S. service members have died in Iraq - a small number by the standards of major wars, and less than 1% of the toll among U.S. soldiers in Vietnam. But already, poll numbers show that public support for the Iraq campaign is slipping badly in the United States. It doesn't bode well for American "idealism." No matter how benevolent may be America's brand of empire, Americans don't seem to have the stomach for it.
Al-Dakhil: The problem is that Mr. Hanson is not talking to me, or to the people in the region, including the Iraqi people. He is talking to himself, repeating the Pentagon's briefings. The issue between us is not whether there is corruption, autocracy, terrorists in the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia. I, and many, do recognize this per se long before this debate. The issue as I see it is that Mr. Hanson, on the foot step of the neocons, wants to make of this administration an angel sent from haven, to save the US, and save the Arabs and Muslims alike.
And my point is that this administration is implementing, on the basis of its interests and political interests and ideology, the foreign policy of the US state. And states, whether American or Arab, are no angels. They have their interests to serve. Now, if the US succeed in bringing stability, democracy, and prosperity to Iraq, be sure that many Arabs and Muslims, myself included, will applause that. And the US, with its potentials and resources, is capable of doing that. But I don't think this administration is capable of doing it, simply because of its rightly tilted and exclusive ideology. Until the Bush administration change the way it is running things in Iraq, things are going to get worse. And it must changed in a way that would convince the Iraqis that US forces will withdraw, and authority will be turned over to the Iraqis themselves.
Remember that before, during, and after the war, the case was the US vs Saddam. Sadly enough the US could not win the propaganda war against the worst regime in the world at the time. What does this tell you? Still, after "liberating" Iraq, the US could not win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. And after fifty years in the region, and hundreds of millions of US dollars on propaganda, the US still have a serious credibility problem in the Arab and Muslim world. In other words, the US power can win the war. the question is; can it win the people? And can it win the peace? It's not a matter of we're for or against American success in Iraq. It's a matter of if, how, and for what. And in the end, and in whichever way, reality will impose itself on all of us.
It's not in our interest that the US fail in Iraq. But the problem is who will define success? For what price? And who is going to pay this price? According to Mr. Hanson, and the Bush administration no body defines success but themselves? This is the problem; i.e., the incapability of this administration to get into a dialogue. All they have is force and imposition.
Mr. Hanson is right about one thing; and that is that the Arabs failed to deliver themselves from the abyss of autocracy and underdevelopment. But he is grossly mistaken to think that "our pride" is the source of our position toward American policy in Iraq, and the region as a whole. In thinking this way, shows how much he knows about the region's politics, and how much his ideology is blurring vision about the reality of US foreign policy. He seems to have the tendency to take this policy at face value. well, every one wish that things are as clear and simple.
Kay: As this debate comes to a close, it is worth reflecting on just how much is at stake in Iraq. It is not merely the fate of one country, but that of the whole region; and indeed, the future of U.S. foreign policy itself.
During the Cold War era, the United States maintained its influence in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and East Asia by propping up dictators thought to be friendly or pliable -- including, at one time, Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran. Even now, Washington maintains close relations with Saudi Arabia, one of the worst human rights offenders on the face of the
The U.S. presence in Iraq is a completely different kind of project, and represents a radical break from Cold War-era foreign-policy "realism." Instead of installing a Western puppet, the U.S. plan was to patiently plant the seeds of accountable, democratic government. Then, after a year or two,
the U.S. presence would gradually melt away, Iraqis would rule themselves, freedom would spread throughout the region, and Arabs would lose their taste for terrorism, warmongering and anti-Semitism. This ambitious blueprint represents a truly revolutionary change in U.S. policy: A democratic government, by definition, cannot be controlled by an outside power. For Washington to bring democracy to a country is to willingly renounce any ability to control it.
Most Arabs, including Al-Dakhil, remain cynical about America's motives. Many still believe a "liberated" Iraq will get a Cold War-style quisling government, if not outright colonial-style occupation. (I wish I could ask all such cynics this question: If America really wanted to control Iraq for itself, why wouldn't it have simply installed a puppet Shiite regime in Baghdad? The Shiites are largely friendly to the United States, and constitute 60% of the country's population. Certainly, creating a Shiite dictatorship would have been a lot easier than going through the messy, halting process of setting up a democracy.)
But as casualties pile up, and the U.S. electorate turns against America's role in Iraq, the issue of Washington's original motives is increasingly becoming moot. The United States will likely leave the country before the groundwork for democracy has been properly laid. The Republican Party will suffer for the whole adventure, and may even lose the presidency in 2004.
Even if George W. Bush remains in office, it is doubtful he will retain much taste for the foreign-policy idealism that animated the Iraq invasion. The age of realism will return, and the campaign to bring freedom to the Muslim world that began on 9/11 will fizzle out - in large part, thanks to a few
thousands Saddamite terrorists.
This is a very gloomy analysis, I realize. But all hope is not lost. First of all, Saddam may be caught. And it's possible that his capture may cause the terrorist insurgency to collapse. Secondly, it is not fantasy to hope that whatever ad hoc government the Americans put in place before scampering away might blossom into something that resembles a Western-style democracy.
If that happens, Paul Wolfowitz and the rest of Washington's idealists might yet be remembered as men who helped bring freedom to the Arab world.
Hanson: "Neocons", "Pentagon briefings," etc. here we have all the same old boilerplate. Most of Mr. Al-Dakhil's tired rhetoric applies to US policy of the last two decades when he was quite right that successive administrations rather cynically looked the other way at Saudi Arabia et al. in exchange for pumping oil and keeping Russians out. But President Bush's recent speech on democracy was Wilsonian--to the chagrin of many traditional conservatives--and marks a departure both from cruise-missile/battleship salvo easy retaliation and the de facto sanction of strongmen. So we shall see whether his deeds match words, but on the face of it the American effort in Iraq marks the most radical endeavour since World War II--its failure leaving abject chaos in the region, its success a chance for the entire Middle East to catch up with the rest of the world and become part of the global community.
Well-meaning critics like Mr. Al Dakhil must show not mistakes in method or lapses in implementation (sumus homines, non dei), but precisely how the present US strategy in removing the Baathists and implementing consensual government either is a grab for oil, or a way to direct politics in the region against the region's interests, or to direct them at all. Over here, there is some cynicism, but of a different sort: we all suspect the Iraqis, like the French, South Koreans, and a host of other saved peoples, as soon as the country is stabilized, the economy restored, the US aid garnered, will simply turn on us and become a sort of Turkey with a democratic European style parliament and fashionable anti-Americanism in the lounges and coffeehouses. And that will be quite fine with us who will hope will be mostly long gone.
As far as going it alone and similar tired charges, if Mr. Al Dakhil will look at the map, he will see that the Japanese, South Koreans, Germans, Italians, Spanish, Turks, Afghans and dozens of others apparently think they have partnerships with the United States--if thousands of rent-paying troops are any indication on their shores, who can fall freely leave anytime at the bequest of the host. There are not French or German troops in any of these places, and so far liberal states are not inviting in Russians or Chinese or Libyans in to enhance their security.
Finally, the spectre of 9-11 looms large over this conversation and all others in the Middle East. There is a certain asymmetry involved: 15 of my countrymen did not ram Saudi jets full of Saudi hostages into the iconic buildings of the Kingdom, killing 3,000 innocent civilians to the more or less smug, though quiet satisfaction of millions of Americans. Had that happened I doubt this present conversation would be taking place.
Glazov: Victor Hanson, Dakhil Al-Dakhil and Jonathan Kay, thank you for joining us. We will see you again soon.
I welcome all of our readers to get in touch with me if they have a good idea for a symposium. Email me at email@example.com
A Saudi Glasnost? Guests: Khalid Al-Dakhil, Andrew Apostolou, Laurent Murawiec and Kenneth R. Timmerman.